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IV

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

After a three-day bench trial and two years of litigation, Appellants seek reversal of the
District Court's decision in this breach of employment contract case.
The appeal is completely without merit. The District Court unequivocally found that Mr.
Thomas Lunneborg was terminated without cause and that Dan and Carrie Edwards lied about
the reason for the termination and then attempted to avoid liability by hiding behind their
corporation. The District Court applied the correct law and supported its decisions with explicit
and extensive findings of fact evidencing the Edwards' dishonesty and treachery in their
dealings with Mr. Lunneborg. By way of example, the trial court found (among other things),
that:
•

Appellee Dan Edwards lied regarding his reason to terminate Mr. Lunneborg (R. Aug.

p. 5, L. 1-2);
•

Appellee Carrie Edwards lied to Mr. Lunneborg in an attempt to cover up Mr. Edwards'
lies (R. Aug. p. 13, L. 9-11);

•

Appellee "Dan Edwards is not to be credible," and that "Lunneborg ... to be credible."
(R. Aug. p. 22, L. 3);

•

Appellee "Dan Edwards fired Lunneborg based on a false rumor" (R. Aug. p. 23, L. 8);

•

Appellees' reasons for terminating Mr. Lunneborg were "false and pretextual" (R. Aug.
p. 25, L. 20-21);
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•

Appellees Dan Edwards and Carrie Edwards disregarded the separate identity of MFL
and the corporate entity of MFL" (R. Aug. p. 36, L. 7-8); and

•

"To allow the Edwards to escape personal liability would be to sanction an injustice and
create an inequitable result" (R. Aug. p. 43, L. 15-16).

On appeal, the Appellants conspicuously ignore the Trial court's extensive factual findings
including those cited above. Rather, Appellants, without legal or factual support, ask that this
Court overturn the trial court's Judgment against them thus absolving their wrongful conduct.
This Court should not entertain such a suggestion.
After over twenty years of sales and product development with the same company,
Plaintiff/Respondent Mr. Thomas Lunneborg, was recruited and hired to be the Chief Operating
Ofiicer ("COO") of a young company, defendant/appellant, My Fun Life Corp. ("MFL"). R.
Aug. p. 7-9. However, Mr. Lunneborg was terminated a mere two months into his new
employment because Mr. Lunneborg was unwilling to use his know-how acquired from his
previous employer to illegally create and market an identical product for MFL. R. Aug. p. 3-15.
Because he was terminated without cause, Mr. Lunneborg was entitled to severance pay from
MFL. R. Aug. p. 3. When Mr. Lunneborg attempted to enforce the terms of his employment
contract, defendants/appellants Dan and Carrie Edwards refused to pay the contractual
severance amount of $60,000. Instead, appellants propounded trumped-up, unfounded (and
unproven) allegations that Mr. Lunneborg was terminated for cause because he had failed to
perform the "central functions of his position" and he was negotiating a consulting agreement
with his former employer that would expressly prohibit him from bringing MFL products to
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market. R. Aug. p. 7. Given the Edwards' unreasonable and deceitful position, Mr. Lunneborg
was forced to seek the help of the court to enforce the contract.
Appellants' offensive behavior also permeated the court proceeding. Indeed, because of
appellants' refusal to comply with proper discovery requests, it took over two years from the
time Mr. Lunneborg filed his initial Complaint until the case was ready to be tried. R. p. 2-12. It
was apparent that appellants used this delay to drain MFL assets and make it judgment proof as
to any potential liability to Mr. Lunneborg. Indeed, by the time the case was tried, Dan and
Carrie Edwards had drained essentially all of MFL's assets such that MFL's bankruptcy petition
(which was filed well into the discovery process), showed MFL only had assets totalling
approximately five dollars. This decrease was a startling and unexplainable contrast to the
viable and prosperous MFL that existed at the time Lunneborg was terminated and filed his
initial Complaint. R. Aug. p. 43, L. 14.
After the bench trial, the trial court found that Mr. Lunneborg was the prevailing party
against all defendants. R. p. 99. In the trial court's exhaustive 48-page Memorandum Decision,
Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, And Order, the trial court found that Mr. Lunneborg had
proven breach of contract and a violation of the Idaho Wage Claim Act and was due his
contractual $60,000 severance payment. The trial court trebled this damage amount pursuant to
I.C. § 45-615. R. Aug. p. 48. The trial court also pierced MFL's corporate veil and found
defendants Dan and Carrie Edwards jointly and severally liable for all damages and attorney
fees. R. Aug. p. 48. In rendering its decision, the District Court made numerous factual
decisions and judgments based upon the evidence presented. Appellants filed a Motion to Alter
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or Amend Judgment, R. p. 10, and then on May 22, 2017, filed a Motion to Disallow Attorney
Fees. Id. The trial court denied both Motions.

B.

Course of Proceedings

Lunneborg filed his Complaint against MFL on December 8, 2014.

Lunneborg's

Complaint alleged: 1) MFL terminated Lunneborg's employment without cause, 2) MFL
breached its contract with Lunneborg, 3) MFL violated the Idaho Wage Claim Act, I.C. § 45
601, et. seq., 3) MFL wrongfully terminated Lunneborg in violation of public policy, and 4)
MFL breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. R. pp. 13-20.
During the course of discovery, MFL failed to comply with the trial court 's July 28th
Order compelling discovery. Therefore, after many continued unsuccessful attempts to secure
discovery from defendants, Lunneborg filed a Motion for Sanctions on October 7, 2015. R. p. 5.
On December 28, 2015, Lunneborg was awarded attorneys' fees related to bringing the Motion
to Compel and the Motion for Sanctions. R. p. 6.
After a delay necessitated by the filing of a bankruptcy petition by MFL, on March 13,
2017, the three-day bench trial began. After the trial both parties were allowed to submit
additional briefing. R. p. 10. On April 17, 2017, the trial court entered a 48-page Memorandum
Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Order. R. Aug. p. 1-48.
On April 25, 2017, Final Judgment was entered against MFL, Dan E. Edwards, and
Carrie L. Edwards jointly and severally. R. p. 99. The District Court's decision found
Mr. Lunneborg to be the prevailing party as to all defendants. R. p. 200, L. 8-10. The trial court
found: (i) Lunneborg had proven breach of contract; and (ii) a violation of the Idaho Wage
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Claim Act by Defendant MFL; (iii) damages in the amount of $60,000, which amount was
properly trebled pursuant to the Idaho Wage Claim Act; and (iv) that Lunneborg was statutorily
entitled to attorneys' fees. R. Aug. p. 48. The trial court also pierced MFL's corporate veil and
found Dan and Carrie Edwards jointly and severally liable for all damages and attorney's fees.
R. pp. 200-01. On June 5, 2017, the trial court entered a 14-page Memorandum Decision and
Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. R. pp. 158-171. The trial
court 's decision detailed its legal and factual basis for holding both Carrie and Dan Edwards
personally liable.
Appellants now seek to overturn the trial court's decisions including its award of
attorneys' fees to Lunneborg.
C.

A Concise Statement of the Facts

Mr. Lunneborg was recruited and hired to be COO of MFL. R. Aug. p. 44, L. 2-4.
However, a mere two months into his new employment Lunneborg was terminated because he
was unwilling violate the law and use his know-how and trade secrets from his previous
employer to illegally create and market an identical product for MFL. R. Aug. p. 1-48.
According to the Edwards, Lunneborg was terminated for cause because he had failed to
perform the "central functions of his position" and he was negotiating a consulting agreement
with his former employer that would expressly prohibit him from bringing MFL products to
marker. R. Aug. p. 7. The trial court found that the alleged causes were false and nothing more
than a pretext for termination. Id. The trial court found that Mr. Lunneborg's termination was
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without cause because Lunneborg fully performed his duties as COO and the Edwards were
aware that Mr. Lunneborg intended to transition out of his previous position.

1.

Tom Lunneborg is recruited to join MFL as its COO.

Prior to being hired by MFL, Tom Lunneborg worked for Oxyfresh for nearly 20 years.
R. Aug. p. 5. Lunneborg served as Oxyfresh's VP of Logistics and Product Development. R.
Aug. p. 5. In that capacity, he along with Dr. Todd Schlapfer (Schlapfer), a naturopath,
developed many products for Oxyfresh, including LifeShotz, a nutritional supplement which
took more than two years to develop. R. Aug. pp. 14-15.
Mr. Lunneborg was recruited and hired by Dan and Carrie Edwards, who own and
operate several corporations in addition to MFL. MFL is a multi-level marketing company that
"sold" memberships to access travel accommodation discounts although the evidence presented
indicated that the Edwards had plans to expand MFL to include additional products. R. Aug. p.
3. Lunneborg was initially introduced to the Edwards by Dr. Schlapfer. R. Aug. p. 5. "Dan
Edwards had known Schlapfer for quite some time," because Schlapfer had treated Edwards'
mother. R. Aug. p. 5, L. 21-22. "Schlapfer knew Dan Edwards was looking for an executivelevel employee to run MFL, 11 and put Edwards in touch with Lunneborg. R. Aug. p. 5. "On
March 27, 2013, Dan and Carrie Edwards, Lunneborg and Schlapfer met [for lunch] at the
Coeur d'Alene Resort Golf Course cafe." R. Aug. p. 5. They discussed Lunneborg's significant
experience in operations and logistics at Oxyfresh and the fact that that MFL recently parted
ways with its COO. Tr. p. 157: 17-25. At trial, Lunneborg was asked about the lunch and why
he thought Dan Edwards was looking for someone to manage the operations of MFL:
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Q. Okay. Did Dan bring up to you that he was looking for a new COO?
A. He brought up to me that he didn't have enough bandwidth and that he
needed somebody to help run his day-to-day.
Tr. p. 162:13-15
A. [that] he wanted somebody to take over the daily stuff that he didn't
enjoy as much, and he wanted to spend more time in the field.
Q. So it was your understanding at that point he was looking for someone
to help him with those with the operations ... ?
A. Yeah, absolutely. He was looking for somebody to take over the
operations.

Tr. p. 164:1-11.
A couple of days later, on March 29, 2014, Mr. Edwards texted Lunneborg the
following: "I want you to know that I am looking for someone like yourself, that knows this
business to run my company so I can go into the field to recruit and train our teams. I don't
particularly care to run day to day operations." Tr. p. 165:11-16. Lunneborg understandably
believed this message to mean that Mr. Edwards was recruiting him to be COO. Tr. p. 166:1-2.
That same day, Dan and Carrie Edwards, Lunneborg, and Lunneborg's fiancee, Brenda, had
dinner together. R. Aug. p. 6. The couples discussed MFL, its potential growth, and why
Lunneborg's experience would be helpful to the company. Tr. pp. 167-168. At the end of the
dinner, the Edwards agreed to let Lunneborg review MFL's financial documents to determine if
he was comfortable joining MFL. Tr. p. 168:6-8.
Two days later, Lunneborg reviewed several of MFL's financial reports provided by
Carrie Edwards. R. Aug. p. 6, L. 22-23. The financial statements showed that MFL had
significant income and low overhead. Tr. p. 309:2-23. On April 16, 2014, Lunneborg signed a
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contract of employment as COO of MFL. R. Aug. p. 6. "Lunneborg's first day as COO of MFL
was May 21, 2014." R. Aug. p. 7.

2.

No consulting agreement existed to facilitate Lunneborg's transition
from Oxyfresh or hinder his ability to perform his duties for MFL.

Although Lunneborg was very excited to start working for MFL and the idea of helping
MFL grow and expand, Lunneborg also appreciated his previous employer - Oxyfresh.
Lunneborg realized that after being with Oxyfresh for over twenty years, his sudden departure
might harm the company and its distributors. Tr. 174: 15-20. In order to ease the transition,
Lunneborg offered to remain at Oxyfresh in a consulting capacity for a period of six months
while the company trained his replacement. Tr. 174: 15-20. Lunneborg openly discussed this
plan with both his new employers - Dan and Carrie Edwards, as well as the head of Oxyfresh
Mr. Brooke. The testimony of both Lunneborg and Dan Edwards evidences that the Edwards
were aware of Lunneborg's intent to consult for Oxyfresh.
Q. And Dan and Carrie knew that you intended to maintain somewhat of
a relationship for about six months with Oxyfresh after you moved
over to MyFunLife full-time, right?
A. (Lunneborg) They were crystal clear. We were very up-front about my
supporting Oxyfresh and Life Matters. It was brought up at our
dinners. It was brought up with Schlapfer. It was brought up
throughout all of our conversations even prior to signing the
agreement.
Tr. p. 175:4-12.
Q. The Q. The most recent draft of the [proposed] consulting agreement .
. . with a place for Dan and Carrie to sign, had you shown that to Dan?
A. Yes.
Q. So did he know prior to this that you had been negotiating a consulting agreement?
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A. He was crystal clear. We'd talked about it a ton of times. We'd texted about it. He'd
seen a draft.

Tr. p. 271 :3-12.
Q . . . . (to Dan Edwards) what is your recollection of when you first
became aware that Mr. Lunneborg was proposing to stay or wanting to
stay on in a consulting capacity for Oxyfresh?
A. (Dan Edwards) I really didn't have a problem with it. Um, I respected
the decision because I know what it takes to make a transition in the
industry. I know it's very tender, and I didn't want anybody to be hurt,
especially Richard Brooke. I didn't want his company to be hurt in
any way.

Tr. p. 502:15-23.
Although Lunneborg intended to help Oxyfresh during a transition period, he never
actually signed a consulting agreement with Oxyfresh. R. Aug. pp. 22-23. Certainly, he signed
no agreement that would have prohibited him from performing his duties at MFL as COO or
bringing products to market for MFL. R. Aug. p. 23. The trial court highlighted Dan Edwards'
testimony demonstrating that Edwards knew Lunneborg had not signed any such consulting
agreement with Oxyfresh.
Dan Edwards was asked at trial, "Doesn't that imply that Tom had not
signed a contract?" Dan Edwards answer was as obtuse as it was
disingenuous. He would not agree with the statement in that question,
and then testified, "I took it to mean the contract we were being asked
to sign." To which Dan Edwards was then asked, "You knew you
hadn't signed the agreement?" Dan Edwards had to admit that. Thus,
Dan Edwards fired Lunneborg as if Lunneborg had signed a contract
with Brooke, while ignoring the fact that Lunneborg had never signed
such a contract.
R. Aug. p. 18, L. 17-23
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3.

Product development was not the primary purpose of Mr. Lunneborg's
employment with MFL.

While Lunneborg and Dan Edwards explored several product options, Mr. Edwards, by
his own admission acknowledged that no decision was made on a product to pursue and it was
he and not Lunneborg who "had the ultimate say." R. Aug. p. 9, L. 13. Additionally, Dan
Edwards did not hire Schlapfer even though Edwards knew that neither he nor Lunneborg had
the training in medicine and chemistry necessary to bring a nutritional product to market. R.
Aug. pp. 13-14. Therefore, "[i]f Dan Edwards had wanted a nutritional product . . . Dan
Edwards needed to get Schlapfer working for him in some capacity. That never occurred." R.
Aug. pp. 12-14.
Although Lunneborg was allegedly fired because he failed "to bring a health and
nutritional product to market," the trial court found this was a ruse because there was
no evidence [presented] that Dan Edwards gave the 'green light to
any product that Lunneborg then refused to take steps to bring to
market. Even if he had, given the fact that Dan Edwards did not
supply Lunneborg with the key person to make that happen,
specifically Schlapfer, not bringing a product to market was simply
not Lunneborg's responsibility within that two-month time frame."
R. Aug. p. 16, L. 10-15. Rather, the evidence demonstrated that Dan Edwards hired Lunneborg
with the unilateral intent of obtaining a copy of the Oxyfresh LifeShotz product for MFL. R.
Aug. p. 21, L. 6-9. When Lunneborg refused to make "an illegal mirror image of LifeShotz,"
and it was apparent to Edwards that MFL would not be bringing a "product to market overnight,
Dan Edwards fired Lunneborg." R. Aug. p. 21, L. 5, 11-12.
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4.

Lunneborg's termination was without cause and the Appellants'
arguments to the contrary are without merit.

Thus, a mere "Sixty-nine days later, on July 29, 2014, Dan Edwards terminated
Lunneborg's employment." R. Aug. p. 7. Mr. Lunneborg's termination letter read:
Dear Tom:
You are aware of the several instances in which I have expressed
concern with your performance in your position at MyFunLIFE,
Inc. After repeatedly attempting to resolve those matters without
success, MyFunLIFE has finally decided to terminate your
employment, effective immediately.
Your termination is for cause, for the following reasons:
1. The central purpose of your employment here was to bring
health and nutritional products to market. You are unable to
make any significant progress to that end, and whenever I have
encouraged you to work on that goal, you have refused to take
action, citing roadblocks that you claim prevent the
development of new products.

2. I have also learned that you have been negotiating a consulting
agreement with your former employer that would expressly
prohibit your from bringing other new products to market. This
is in direct competition with your duties at MyFunLIFE and a
serious breach of your obligations to us. We cannot continue to
pay an employee who not only fails to perform the central
functions of his position, but is motivated to continue in that
failure by an outside consulting arrangement that requires
continued inaction.
We regret that we are forced to take this action and wish you the
very best in your future professional endeavors.
Sincerely,
MyFunLIFE
Dan Edwards, CEO
R. Aug. p. 7.
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Lunneborg knew the alleged reasons in the termination letter were without merit, and
therefore, requested his termination pay. When the Edwards refused, Lunneborg was forced to
file the underlying action. The trial court agreed with Lunneborg that the termination letter was
merely a smokescreen to cover appellants' wrongful and duplicitous behavior. In fact, the trial
court determined: (1) Lunneborg's termination was without cause; (2) Dan and Carrie Edwards
disregarded MFL's corporate form and drained MFL's funds by manipulating the assets and
liabilities by and among their entities and personal accounts with the intent of avoiding payment
of any potential liability to Mr. Lunneborg; and (3) Mr. Lunneborg was entitled to the attorney's
fees awarded.

5.

The District Court's factual determinations are supported by the
evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal.

Appellants spend very little space in their brief identifying errors of law, likely because
none exist. Rather, appellants attempt to persuade this Court that the trial court did not properly
interpret and decide the facts at trial.

Of course, this Court should refrain from taking

appellants' invitation, and should provide the proper deference and respect due to the trial
court's factual decisions. The trial court's decision should be affirmed.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court err in finding that My Fun Life Corp. ("MFL") terminated
Mr. Lunneborg's employment without cause?

2.

Did the District Court err in piercing MFL's corporate veil?
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3.

Did the District Court err when it determined that Carrie Edwards' separate
property and interest in the community estate of Dan and Carrie Edwards is
subject to the Final Judgment?

4.

Did the District Court err in awarding Plaintiff attorney's fees and costs in the
amount of $167,028.69 plus post judgment interest?

III.

ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL
An additional issue on appeal is attorneys' fees.

Lunneborg seeks attorney's fees on

appeal pursuant to Idaho Code sections 12-120(3) and 12-121. Idaho Code section 12-120(3)
entitles the prevailing party in any civil action arising from a commercial transaction to recover
attorney fees. "All transactions other than those for personal or household purposes are
considered commercial transactions." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 755 (2012).
"[l]n order for a transaction to be commercial, each party to the transaction must enter the
transaction for a commercial purpose." Id. at 756. Because this appeal arose out of a
commercial transaction, the prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees. Mr. Lunneborg also
seeks attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. "Section 12-121 permits an award of attorney
fees in a civil action to the prevailing party if the court determines the case was brought,
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Ravenscroft v. Boise

Cnty., 154 Idaho 613, 617 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, "[a]ttorney fees
are awardable if an appeal does no more than simply invite an appellate court to second-guess
the trial court on conflicting evidence, or if the law is well settled and appellant has made no
substantial showing that the district court misapplied the law." Johnson v. Edwards, 113 Idaho
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660, 662, 747 P.2d 69, 71 (1987) In this case, appellants' simply invite the Court to secondguess the trial court's factual findings, therefore the appeal is frivolous and brought without
adequate foundation entitling Lunneborg is entitled to attorneys' fees under I.C. § § 12-120(3)
and 12-121. Lunneborg also requests attorneys' fees under I.AR 41(a).

IV.

ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review

The review of a trial court's decision after a court trial is limited to ascertaining
"whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the
conclusions of law." Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Imp. Dist., 135
Idaho 316,319, 17 P.3d 260,263 (2000). The trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside
unless clearly e1Toneous. Id.; I.C. § 52(a). Thus, if the findings of fact are supported by
substantial and competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, the reviewing court will
not disturb those findings. Idaho Forest Industries, Inc., 135 Idaho at 319, 17 P.3d at 263. In
view of the trial court's role to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the
credibility of witnesses, the trial court's findings of fact must be liberally construed in favor of
the judgment entered. Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118
Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990). In reviewing a trial court's conclusions of law,
however, the reviewing court is not bound by the legal conclusions of the trial court, but may
draw its own conclusions from the facts presented. Idaho Forest Industries, Inc., 135 Idaho at
319, 17 P.3d at 263; Indep. Lead Mines v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26, 137 P.3d 409,
413 (2006).
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B.

The District Court did not err in.finding that MFL terminated Lunneborg's
employment without cause.

At trial, the parties agreed that Lunneborg signed an employment agreement with MFL.
R. Aug. p. 3. The employment agreement provided in part, that if Mr. Lunneborg was
terminated without cause, he was entitled to a severance wage equaling six months of his
salary. Tr. p. 24, ,r,r 4-5. Because Mr. Lunneborg's salary with MFL was $10,000 per month, six
months' tem1ination pay was $60,000. R. Aug. p. 3.

The parties did not dispute that Mr.

Lunneborg began working for MFL on May 21, 2014, and that he was terminated on July 29,
2014. R. Aug. p. 3. However, they did dispute whether MFL terminated Lunneborg without
cause, thus entitling Lunneborg to the $60,000 in severance pay. R. Aug. p. 3. Therefore, the
District Court was tasked with the fact-intensive analysis of determining whether MFL had
"good cause" to terminate Mr. Lunneborg. R. Aug. p. 3.

I.

The District Court applied the correct law.

The trial court correctly noted that "[w]here good cause is required, the employer must
show that the employee did something wrong that justified the termination." R. Aug. p. 4 (citing
Metcalfv. Jntermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622,630, 778 P.2d 744, 752 (1989)). Thus, good
cause depends on whether the employer had an objectively reasonable basis for the termination
"based on facts (1) supported by substantial evidence and (2) reasonably believed to be true." R.
Aug. p. 4. The District Court found that good cause did not exist in this case because "neither of
the two reasons given [in the termination letter are] true ... [and] [n ]either of the two reasons
are supported by the evidence." R. Aug. p. 7. The trial court also stated that "even if Dan
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Edwards believed in the truth of those reasons, such belief was not reasonable." R. Aug. p. 5.
Because the trial court 's findings are supported by the evidence, this Court must affirm.
In their brief, appellants argue that the trial court erred because it "[s]ubstitut[ ed] its
judgment for that of the employer." Appellants' Br. p. 28. In other words, according to
appellants, the trial court should not have weighed the facts and evidence presented to
determine whether MFL had cause to terminate Mr. Lunneborg. Rather, the trial court was
apparently expected to solely rely on Dan Edwards' belief, or more accurately the pretext he
manufactured, that he had reason to terminate Mr. Lunneborg. This is because, according to the
appellants, "courts are not authorized to second guess an employer." Appellants' Br. p. 29.
Contrary to appellants' argument, this is not a correct description of Idaho law. Rather, "where
there exists a conflict with respect to the circumstances surrounding the employee's discharge,
the existence of good cause is an issue for the trier offact." Rosecrans v. Intermountain Soap &

Chem. Co., I 00 Idaho 785, 787, 605 P.2d 963, 965 (1980). Thus, the trial court applied the
correct law and it did exactly what it was charged with doing -- it analyzed and weighed the
evidence presented, it used its firsthand observation of the testimony to evaluate the demeanor
and credibility of the various witnesses, and it made reasonable and well supported findings as
to whether good cause existed for Lunneborg's termination. Based on substantial credible
evidence, the trial court found that Lunneborg was terminated without cause. Although
appellants disagree with this finding, they fail to provide any credible evidence that the trial
court erred and therefore, the trial court should be affirmed.
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2.

The District Court's findings were supported by substantial and
competent evidence.

Given that the trial court applied the correct Idaho law, the next question is whether the
trial court 's holding is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Of this, there should
be no doubt. Indeed, more than 20 pages of discussion of the facts supports its decision.
Importantly, despite appellants argument to the contrary, it is the province of the trial court, not
the reviewing court, to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and judge the credibility of
witnesses.

Appellants had a full and fair opportunity to present their evidence and their

argument. The trial court simply did not believe appellants' testimony. Appellants incorrectly
believe that alleging legal error in their brief transforms the fact-based issue of "cause" into an
issue of law. Appellants ask this Court to review the same facts, weigh the evidence and
credibility of the witnesses, and ultimately come to a different conclusion. However, as this
Court has reminded parties many times, the reviewing court is not authorized to "go behind
such findings, and ... to say whether they are contrary to the weight of the evidence, that
function being wholly for the trial court." Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 513, 520, 373 P.2d 929, 933
(1962).
Appellants further argue that the trial court did not give Dan Edwards' reasons for
terminating Lunneborg proper deference. Appellants' Br. p. 30, L. 3-4. Contrary to Appellants'
argument, the extensive recitation of facts and findings in its Memorandum Decision leaves no
doubt that the trial court fully heard and considered Mr. Edwards' reasons for terminating
Lunneborg. The trial court just did not believe Mr. Edwards. The District Court found that Mr.
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Edwards was not credible. Conversely, the trial court found that Lunneborg and Dr. Schlapfer
were credible ("Court finds Dan Edwards not to be credible in his "sugarcoating" explanation",
R. Aug. p. I 3; "Court finds Lunneborg and Schlapfer credible on this point, that Dan Edwards
specifically asked them to make an illegal mirror image of LifeShotz", R. Aug. p. 21; "Court
finds Lunneborg and Schlapfer to be credible, and Dan Edwards not to be credible" R. Aug. p.
22) (emphasis added).

It was absolutely the trial court's duty and right to listen to the conflicting evidence and
determine the credibility of the witnesses. In doing so, the trial court found Dan Edwards'
version of the facts was not believable and that even if it believed Dan Edwards, the alleged
reasons were unreasonable given the evidence presented . R. Aug. p. 5, L. 1-4. The trial court
further found that Carrie Edwards lied to cover up Mr. Edwards' lies. R. Aug. p. 13, L. 9-11 .
This Court simply does not weigh credibility of witnesses; that is exclusively the province of
the trial court.
Although appellants want to believe that the trial court was required to take Dan
Edwards' reasons for terminating Lunneborg at face value, the trial court properly analyzed the
reasonableness and credibility of each "for cause" reasons alleged by Dan Edwards in
Lunneborg's termination letter. After careful analysis, the trial court found that neither reason
was supported by the facts nor believable. R. Aug. p. 7.
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(i)

The District Court found that bringing products to market was
not the central purpose of Mr. Lunneborg's employment, and
even if it was, it was not realistic that Lunneborg could bring a
nutritional or health product to market to within two months
without the help of Schlapfer and without the go ahead from Dan
Edwards.

Lunneborg's termination letter included two "for cause" termination reasons. The first
reason stated: "The central purpose of your employment here was to bring health and nutritional
products to market. You are unable to make any significant progress to that end, and whenever I
have encouraged you to work on that goal, you have refused to take action, citing roadblocks
that you claim prevent the development of new products." R. Aug. p. 7. The trial court found
that this alleged reason for the termination was not supported by the evidence, and therefore,
did not support a finding of termination for cause. R. Aug. p. 16.
First, the trial court acknowledged that the parties presented conflicting argument and
evidence as to why MFL hired Lunneborg and Lunneborg's primary duties while employed by
MFL. Dan Edwards and MFL argued that Lunneborg was hired "primarily to develop products
for MFL." R. Aug. p. 9. Lunneborg on the other hand, offered evidence proving that he was
primarily hired to run MFL. R. Aug. p. 9 (emphasis added). The trial court agreed with.
Lunneborg. The court determined that Lunneborg's central purpose was running MFL by
serving as the Chief Operating Officer ("COO"). Although both parties anticipated that Mr.
Lunneborg would be involved in MLF's product development, bringing products to market was

not Mr. Lunneborg's "central purpose.". R. Aug. p. 7 (emphasis in original). Some of the facts
identified by the trial court as the basis of this determination included: (1) objective facts such
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as the position description in Lunneborg's Offer of Employment, which read "Position. You will
serve in a full-time capacity as Chief Operating Officer of the Company. You will report to the
CEO." R. Aug. p. 9; (2) Communications from Dan Edwards evidencing an intent for Mr.
Lunneborg to run MFL, including a text from Edwards to Lunneborg "I am looking for
someone like yourself, that knows this business to run my company so I can go into the field to
recruit and train our teams. I don't particularly care to run day to day operations" R. Aug. p. 11;
(3) Communication from Carrie Edwards to Mr. Lunneborg, confirming that product
development was not the primary purpose "NO, Dan did not say you were hired only to bring
us products!" R. Aug. p. 13; (4) facts as to the way Lunneborg's position was presented to
members and others including the fact that "Dan and Carrie Edwards took a vacation the first
two weeks that Lunneborg began working, and before they left, Dan Edwards . . . told the
employees to take direction from Lunneborg." R. Aug. p. 10, and a webcast Dan Edwards
broadcasted to members on Mr. Lunneborg's first day of work, "He [Lunneborg] will be
overseeing operations and marketing." R. Aug. p. 10.
The trial court also examined the reasonableness of expecting Lunneborg to bring a
nutritional product to market within two months when Edwards did not provide the resources or
expertise necessary for such an undertaking. Indeed, the trial court found that even if MFL's
central purpose in hiring Lunneborg was product development, it was unreasonable for MFL to
believe that Lunneborg could accomplish such a task within two months. R. Aug. p. 5.
According to the trial court, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that product
development takes longer than two months and Lunneborg did not possess the scientific
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engmeenng skills necessary to formulate a health or nutritional product. Therefore, Mr.
Edwards need to and failed to get Schlapfer contracted to help MFL. R. Aug. pp. 9-16.
The trial court first focused on the evidence and testimony demonstrating that
"Lunneborg could not bring [a nutritional] product to market by himself. He would need [the
help of] someone like [Dr.] Schlapfer." R. Aug. p. 10. L. 20-21. The trial court noted that
neither Lunneborg nor Edwards had the chemical engineering skills necessary to create a
nutritional or skin care product, rather, Schlapfer or someone with similar skills was necessary
for product development. R. Aug. p. 14. "Lunneborg is not a doctor; he is not a chemist.
Lunneborg's skills are bringing the product to production, marketing the product, and
distributing the product. The only person ... who could actually come up with the formulation
for a product was [Dr. Todd] Schlapfer." R. Aug. p. 14. Accordingly, the trial court found that
"Lunneborg was not responsible for the first two steps in bringing a nutritional product to
market, [because] Dan Edwards was the one to make the determination of what product to bring
to market [and] Dan Edwards was responsible for obtaining the services of [Dr. Todd]
Schlapfer to formulate that nutritional product." R. Aug. p. 9, L.1-2 (emphasis in the original).
Although Edwards discussed MFL hiring Schlapfer, this never happened. R. Aug. p. 14.
Importantly, the trial court understood that "the task of getting Schlapfer on contract with MFL
was upon Dan Edwards, [not Lunneborg] and Dan Edwards failed in that regard." R. Aug. p.
14.
The trial court also focused on the unreasonableness of the timeline for bringing a new
product to market. According to the trial court, the unequivocal evidence supported a finding
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that the process to bring a product to market takes "more than two months." R. Aug. p. 14, L.
24. The trial court found Dan Edwards not credible in his assertions that "Lunneborg could
have immediately brought a nutritional product to market" because four days before terminating
Lunneborg for failing to bring nutritional products to market, "Dan Edwards' own handwritten
notes indicated that after identifying a potential product they were [still] 16 weeks to 22 weeks
away" because there was "8-10 weeks to get formulation ready" and

11

8-12 weeks

manufacturing." R. Aug. p. 15; L. 12-13, 15-17.
Finally, the trial court determined that it was not reasonable for Edwards to allege that
Lunneborg was terminated due to his alleged failure to bring a health product to market because
it was Edwards who actually had the ultimate say as to product development and he had never
given Lunneborg the green light to begin developing any product. In support of this finding, the
District Court highlighted the chain of command and the fact that Mr. Lunneborg as COO

reported to CEO Dan Edwards. R. Aug. p. 9, L. 6. Therefore, "Dan Edwards retained the
ultimate say," and "any new product Lunneborg proposed to be brought to market would need
Dan Edwards' approval. 11 R. Aug. p. 10, L. 19. "Dan Edwards would be the one to make final
approval of whether MFL's assets would be directed to research and development of a product,
and that ... decision [could] only [be made] after he made the decision on what the product
should be. 11 R. Aug. p. 13 (emphasis in original). Importantly, "two weeks before Dan Edwards
fired Lunneborg for not bringing a nutritional product to market, Dan Edwards had not even
determined what that product might be." R. Aug. p. 13 Again, contrary to the appellants'
assertions, the trial court found that there was "no evidence [presented] that Dan Edwards gave
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the 'green light' to any product that Lunneborg then refused to take steps to bring to market.
Even if he had ... Dan Edwards did not supply Lunneborg with the key person to make that
happen, specifically Schlapfer." R. Aug. p. 16, L. 11-16. Therefore, Lunneborg was simply not
equipped with the time, skills, or authority to bring a nutritional product to market "within that
two-month time frame." R. Aug. p. 16, L. 17.
The foregoing is merely a glimpse of the extensive evidence relied upon by the trial
court in its determination that the first reason given by Mr. Edwards for terminating Mr.
Lunneborg was not based on substantial evidence and was not believable. Because the District
Court's finding that the first reason for termination was pretext is supported by substantial and
competent evidence, the District Court should be affirmed as to this issue.

(ii)

Dan Edwards knew Lunneborg maintained a relationship with
Oxyfresh/Brooke, and knew or should have known that
Lunneborg did not sign an agreement with his former employer
Oxyfresh which specifically prohibited Lunneborg from
developing new products for MFL.

Mr. Edwards continued his letter of termination to Lunneborg by stating:
I have also learned that you have been negotiating a consulting
agreement with your former employer that would expressly
prohibit your from bringing other new products to market. This is
in direct competition with your duties at MyFunLIFE and a serious
breach of your obligations to us. We cannot continue to pay an
employee who not only fails to perform the central functions of his
position, but is motivated to continue in that failure by an outside
consulting arrangement that requires continued inaction.
R. Aug. p. 7. The trial court found this alleged reason "to be false and pretextual." R. Aug. p.
25. The trial court noted that in order for Dan Edwards "not run afoul of multilevel marketing
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laws," he "needed a physical product to sell along with his vacation discounts." R. Aug. p. 21.
Therefore, the evidence presented demonstrated that Edwards hired Lunneborg with the intent
of having Lunneborg copy the popular Oxyfresh LifeShotz product for MFL. R. Aug. p. 21.
However, when Lunneborg refused, Dan Edwards fired him, using the pretext of "an imagined
conflict of interest between Lunneborg and Oxyfresh/Brooke as the basis for his decision to fire
Lunneborg." R. Aug. p. 21. Again, the trial court thoroughly and explicitly supported it findings
and accordingly, the trial court 's decision should be affirmed.
First, the trial court focused on the facts supporting the proposition that Dan Edwards
wanted a Life Shotz-like product and became frustrated and fired Lunneborg when Lunneborg
refused to break the law and give it to him. Both Lunneborg and Schlapfer testified that Dan
Edwards had asked them to create a mirror image of Life Shatz for My Fun Life. R. Aug. p. 19,
L. 16; p. 20, L. 9-11. Both men refused stating that it was not ethical. R. Aug. p. 19, L. 16; p.
20, L. 9-11. Although Edwards denied the allegation, the trial court found "Lunneborg and
Schlapfer credible on this point, that Dan Edwards specifically asked them to make an illegal
mirror image of LifeShotz." R. Aug. p. 21, L. 4-5.
Thus, it was clear to the trial court that any refusal by Lunneborg to create a mirror
image of the Oxyfresh Life Shatz product was because such action would be illegal and
unethical and not because Lunneborg had signed some contract with Oxyfresh prohibiting him
from helping MFL create products to market. R. Aug. p. 3 23-24. The trial court focused on
evidence indicating that contrary to Dan Edwards' assertions, Edwards was always aware of
Lunneborg's intent to maintain a limited involvement with Oxyfresh by serving as a consultant.
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Dan Edwards was asked by his attorney at trial in the defense casein-chief, "When were you first aware plaintiff wanted to consult
with Brooke?", to which Dan Edwards really didn't answer that
question, but then stated, "I had no problem with it, I didn't want
Brooke to be hurt, Plaintiff told me it would be a couple hours a
week at lunch time, and that seemed reasonable." It is
uncontradicted that Dan Edwards knew Lunneborg still performed
some work for Brooke. This knowledge makes the fact that Dan
Edwards fired Lunneborg based on an unsubstantiated rumor all
the more untenable. These facts deprive Dan Edwards of his ability
to claim his firing of Lunneborg was "for cause."
R. Aug. p. 23, L. 9-17.
The trial court also found it unbelievable and incredulous that Edwards would fire
Lunneborg for entering into an alleged contract with Oxyfresh without first asking his
employee and COO "Lunneborg for his side of the story." R. Aug. p. 23, L. 2-3. Importantly,
the trial court found this alleged conflict of interest asserted by Edwards to be disingenuous
because Edwards admitted that he "knew Lunneborg still performed some work for
[Oxyfresh]," there was no evidence of a signed contract between Lunneborg and Oxyfresh, and
because Edwards never confronted Lunneborg about the alleged contract R. Aug. p. 23.
The trial court summarized why Dan Edwards' version of the events was not believable
as follows:
Dan Edwards went without any COO for April and May 2014, yet
Dan Edwards only gave Lunneborg two months before terminating
him. Dan Edwards testified about the wrongdoings of his previous
COO, testified that he had no COO in April and May, thus he was
anxious to hire Lunneborg the end of May. Yet, Dan Edwards only
gave him two months before Dan Edwards terminated Lunneborg.
That makes absolutely no business sense. That makes no common
sense. It is a lie by Dan Edwards that he was terminating
Lunneborg for failing to bring a nutritional product to market.

Respondent's Brief - 25
{S1640955; 1}

R. Aug. p. 24, L. 3-10 (emphases added).
Contrary to Appellants' assertions, the trial court applied the correct law and its finding
that Lunneborg was terminated without cause is supported by substantial and competent
evidence. The Edwards were found to be liars and not believable by the trial court. There is no
cause to overturn those findings.
C.

The Edwards Used the Corporate Form of MFL to Commit Injustice and Injury
on Lunneborg; Therefore, the District Court Did Not Err in Piercing MFL 's
Corporate Veil.

The general rule is that the owners of a corporation are not personally liable for a
corporation's contracts or debts. See Barlow's Inc. v. Bannock Cleaning Corp., 103 Idaho 310,
314-15, 647 P.2d 766, 770-71 (1982). However, under Idaho law, a court may disregard a
corporate entity (i.e., "pierce the corporate veil") if there is "such a unity of interest and
ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and individual no longer exist," and
if a showing is made that "if the acts are treated as those of the corporation, an inequitable result
will follow or that it would sanction a fraud or promote injustice." Hutchison v. Anderson, 130
Idaho 936, 940, 950 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Ct. App.1997).
Thus, it was proper for the trial court to pierce MFL's corporate veil if Lunneborg
established the following: (1) a unity of interest and ownership to a degree that the separate
personalities of the corporation and individual no longer exist and (2) if the acts are treated as
acts of the corporation, an inequitable result would follow. Appellants' Br. p. 34, L. 5-8 (citing

Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586 (2014). Although
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Appellants agree that this is the law of Idaho, Appellants go on to argue that piercing the
corporate veil also required a showing that MFL financial transactions were improper, illegal,
and/or failed to follow accounting procedures. Appellants' Br. p. 37, L. 7-8; p. 38, L. 11-13; p.
39, L. 14-18; p. 40, L. 1-2. Appellants argue that Lunneborg did not establish that MFL
accounting procedures were not followed or that the many corporate transfers were illegal,
therefore, the trial court erred in piercing the corporate veil. See, e.g., Appellants' Br. p. 38, L.
11-13 ("unless Lunneborg can show this was an illegal or improper transfer, or that accounting
procedures were not followed [the court could not pierce MFL corporate veil]"). However, this
strawman argument is not a correct statement of Idaho law. Rather, the trial court applied the
correct standard and a thorough review of the record demonstrates there was substantial
competent evidence to support the trial court 's findings. R. Aug. p. 29-43. Therefore, the trial
court must be affirmed.
First, the trial court began its analysis by correctly noting that whether to pierce a
corporate veil is a heavily fact-specific inquiry and courts have identified numerous factors to
assist in the analysis. R. Aug. p. 29. Some of the factors used by Idaho courts when deciding
whether to pierce the corporate veil, include, but are not limited to: (1) the level of control that
the shareholder exercises over the corporation; (2) the lack of corporate formalities, such as
failing to hold regular directors' or shareholders' meetings, maintaining written minutes for
these meetings and/or adopting corporate by-laws; (3) shareholders failed to submit corporate
contracts or loans for approval by the board of directors; (4) corporate funds were transferred,
corporate accounts were accrued and paid and/or corporate claims were satisfied without
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approval by the board of directors; (5) the corporation was not represented to third parties as an
entity separate from its shareholders; and/or (6) the corporation's initial capitalization was
inadequate to meet the corporation's "reasonably foreseeable potential liabilities." Alpine
Packing Co. v. HH Keim Co., 121 Idaho 762, 764-65, 828 P.2d 325, 327-28 (Ct.App.1991);
Hutchison v. Anderson, 130 Idaho 936, 940, 950 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Ct.App.1997); Nakamura,
Inc. v. G & G Produce Co., 93 Idaho 183, 184-85, 457 P.2d 422, 423-24 (1969). The above

factors are not exclusive because the conditions under which a corporate entity may be
disregarded vary according to the circumstances of the case. 1 Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel
Mortuary, Inc., 95 ldaho 599,601,514 P.2d 594,596 (1973).

1.

The Edwards and MFL shared such a unity of interest and ownership
that the separate personalities of the corporation and individual no
longer existed.

The first inquiry to pierce the corporate veil is whether the separate personalities of the
person and the corporation were indistinguishable. In their brief, Appellants correctly assert that
the mere failure to adhere to corporate formalities does not automatically create liability.
Appellants' Br. p. 36, L. 1-4. However, it is a factor that courts may consider. See, e.g.,
Hutchison v. Anderson, 130 Idaho at 940, 950 P.2d at 1279. In this case, MFL did not observe

any corporate formalities. It did not issue any stock certificates, it did not conduct regular
corporate meetings, and the only corporate minutes MFL kept were the initial meeting minutes.
The District Court applied the correct law despite stating later in its Memorandum Decision that "Lunneborg need
only prove one factor in order to pierce the corporate veil of MFL and hold Dan Edwards and Carrie Edwards
personally liable to Lunneborg." R. Aug. p. 32. At most this may be harmless error because it is not the standard the
District Court utilized when making its decision to pierce MFL's corporate veil. Indeed, in the next sentence the
District Court notes that "nearly all these various factors have been met in light of the facts of the present case."
Therefore, it is clear that District Court did not base its decision to pierce MFL's corporate veil on the existence of
only one factor demonstrating unity of interest between the individual and the corporation.
1
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R. Aug. p. 32, L. 18-21. Additionally, MFL did not observe corporate formalities with respect
to positions within the company. Carrie Edwards testified that "she was the Chief
Administrative Officer ... she was [also] the COO for a few weeks before Lunneborg was hired
and, after that, was Executive Vice President," despite the fact that "there were no corporate
resolutions authorizing Carrie Edwards to assume any of these positions." R. Aug. p. 32, L.1418. Nor was there a corporate resolution authorizing the hiring or firing of Mr. Lunneborg.
The trial court next focused on the extensive evidence showing regular comingling of
funds. The court concluded that according to the evidence presented, "the lines between [the
Edwards'] personal assets and the assets of all their businesses, including MFL, were heavily
blurred." R. Aug. p. 36, L. 12-14. The parties did not dispute that in addition to owning MFL,
Dan and Carrie Edwards owned at least four additional companies: Ink Drop Signs, TraffiCorp,
Hawaiian Sun Tanning Salon, and an LLC to hold their real property. R. Aug. p. 32, L. 20-21.
Carrie Edwards testified that the various corporations "gave advance monies to each other", that
"one to two times a month, depending on cash flow" they would transfer money from one
corporation to another, then back again. She testified that this was done to "help out" their
various businesses. She also "testified this was all kept track in their records, and it all got paid
back." R. Aug. p. 32, L. 24-25; p. 33, L. 1-3. The trial court found that Carrie Edwards
statement was not credible and not supported by the evidence. R. Aug. p. 33, L. 17-19. Rather,
the trial court found that "Dan and Carrie Edwards produced no written documents to evidence
the many transfers of funds between themselves and their companies . . . there were no loan
documents, no contracts, no bank statements, and no notes evidencing these transfers. There
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were no corporate minutes to document these transfers. And even the spreadsheet contradicts
Carrie Edwards' testimony that those transfers were paid back to MFL." R. Aug. p. 36, L. 1522. According to the trial court, contrary to the Edwards' assertions, there was " no evidence to
show that MFL was ever paid back or made whole by TraffiCorp or Ink Drop Signs." R. Aug.
p. 37, L. 28-29.
Carrie Edwards' testimony as to the payment of expenses and the accounting for the
personal and corporate credit cards also demonstrated the blurring of lines and unity of interest
by and among the various closely-held businesses the Edwards' personal accounts. R. Aug. pp.
34-36. Evidence was presented that the corporate credit cards were routinely used to purchase
personal items and for personal expenses. R. Aug. p. 35. The trial court noted that although the
Edwards alleged that the commingling and transfers of money between accounts was proper
and trackable, the evidence contradicted their testimony. The evidence highlighted the lack of
any proper accounting and great confusion as to where money went and why, that it was not
possible for the Edwards to demonstrate whose money was in each account during any specific
time. R. Aug. p. 32-36. In the District Court's Memorandum Decision, it identified several
pages of transactions demonstrating the commingling of funds without concern and without
proper accounting or reconciliation. R. Aug. p. 32-38. The trial court properly concluded that
financial evidence showed that the "Edwards used the MFL credit cards ... as if they were their
personal assets, rather than corporate assets." R. Aug. p. 40, L.1-2.
The trial court also found that Dan Edwards and Carrie Edwards did not identify
"themselves as MFL employees and did not report receiving any salary." R. Aug. p. 36, L. 21-
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22. Rather, the Edwards identified themselves as independent contractors, allowing them to
disguise and avoid paying taxes on the hundreds of thousands of dollars their family withdrew
from MFL. R. Aug. p. 38, L. 22-24. The trial court exclaimed that "it defies belief that the
president and executive vice president of a corporation would qualify as independent
contractors for the purposes of receiving a Form 1099." R. Aug. p. 39, L.3-5. According to the
trial court, the routine payments of the Edwards' personal expenses by their closely-held
businesses including MFL, "constituut[ed] a diversion of corporate assets to the Edwards." R.
Aug. p. 39, L. 22-23. Finally, the court found the fact that most of the Edwards closely held
companies operated out of the same location with no consistent allocation of costs was evidence
of a unity of identity. R. Aug. pp. 38-40.
Based on the testimony and evidence presented, the trial court correctly concluded that
"the first prong of the piercing of the corporate veil test-unity of interest-is clearly
established." R. Aug. p. 40, L. 14-15. Because a review of the record demonstrates that this
finding is supported by substantial competent evidence, the District Court should be affirmed.
2.

It was necessary to pierce MFL 's corporate veil, because an injustice
would have resulted if only MFL were held liable.

The second inquiry when piercing the corporate veil is whether an inequitable result
would follow if only the corporation was held liable. Hutchinson, 130 Idaho at 940, 950 P.2d at
1279. The trial court correctly noted that when determining the second element, Idaho requires
"something less than an affirmative showing of fraud but something more than the mere
prospect of an unsatisfied judgment." R. Aug. p. 40, L. 16-19 (citing Wachovia Secs., LLC v.
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Banco Panamericano, Inc., 674 F.3d 743, 756 (7th Cir. 2012)). In this case, the trial court
found the second element existed and this finding should be affirmed because it is supported by
substantial competent evidence.
From the evidence presented, the trial court properly found that Dan and Carrie Edwards
drained MFL assets not only for their personal benefit, but also to become judgment-proof
against Lunneborg's claim for severance pay. R. Aug. p. 40-43. The trial court concluded that
piercing the corporate veil in this case was justified because, similar to other cases in which the
veil was pierced, the Edwards, "through the issuance of dividends and bonuses and repayment
of undocumented loans, bled the corporation of assets so that it would not be able to satisfy a
known corporate liability." R. Aug. p. 41, L. 25-26. The court highlighted that the Edwards
were so successful at diverting funds from MFL, that as of June 22, 2016, MFL was forced to
file bankruptcy with only a little more than five dollars in assets. R. Aug. p. 43, L. 12-14. Thus,
any attempts by Lunneborg to collect on a judgement against MFL would have been futile. See

Contra Ross v. Coleman Co., 114 ldaho 817,832,761 P.2d 1169, 1184 (1988) (noting there
was nothing in the record to "reflect that [the corporation] was inadequately capitalized and as a
result could not respond to a judgment against it"); see also, e.g., Hutchison, 130 Idaho at 940,
950 P .2d at 1279 (1997) (considering that the corporation "was undercapitalized and thus any
attempt to collect on a judgment against it would probably be futile") (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Baker v. Kulczyk, 112 Idaho 417, 420, 732 P.2d 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1987) (discussing
whether defendant corporations may have sufficient worth to satisfy a judgment). The District
Court found that the Edwards, "[i]nstead of paying the severance to Lunneborg as provided in
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his employment contract ... drained MFL of all income and assets by diverting those assets and
income to themselves and to TraffiCorp." R. Aug. p. 43, L. 9-12.
In this case, the trial court 's decision to pierce MFL's corporate veil should be affirmed
because substantial competent evidence demonstrates that not only is the unity of interest and
ownership requirement met, but an inequitable result will arise if MFL's corporate entity is not
disregarded as against the Edwards. As the trial court correctly cautioned, "allow[ing] the
Edwards to escape personal liability would be to sanction an injustice and create an inequitable
result." R. Aug. p. 43, L. 15-16.

D.

The District Court Did Not Err in Finding Carrie Edwards' Separate Property
and Interest in the Community Marital Estate is Subject to the Final Judgment.

Appellants argue that the trial court erred in subjecting Carrie Edwards' property to the
Final Judgment. Appellants' Br. p. 40. Appellants made the same unsuccessful argument to the
trial court in their Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. R. p. 159, L. 6-8. The trial court denied
the motion in a 14-page Memorandum Decision and Order. R. pp. 158-171. The trial court
found Carrie Edwards personally liable because she actively participated in the misconduct that
led to the piercing ofMFL's corporate veil. R. p. 170, L 1-8; p. 171, L. 1-10. The trial court's
decision is supported by substantial competent evidence and it should be affirmed.
Appellants argue that the District Court erred because Carrie Edwards "never agreed
that such property could be reached under I.C. § 32-912" and because she was not a
shareholder. Appellants' Br. p. 40,

i

D, L. 2-4, 10-13. The District Court found both arguments

unpersuasive. The District Court acknowledged in its Memorandum Decision and Order
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Denying Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ("Order Denying"), that "Idaho
courts have not squarely addressed whether an individual must be [a] shareholder to be
potentially liable for corporate debts." R. p. 165, L. 4-6 (citing Swenson v. Bushman Investment

Properties, Ltd., 870 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D. Idaho 2012). However, the District Court agreed
with the reasoning of several other courts and concluded "that shareholder status is not a
prerequisite or bar to piercing the corporate veil." R. p. 167, L. 1-4 (e.g. Buckley v. Abuzir, 8.
N.E.3d 1166 (Ill. Ct. App. 2014); Fontana v. TLD Builders, Inc., 362 Ill. App. 3d 491 (2005)).
Thus, the District Court properly concluded that "shareholder status is a factor to consider when
deciding whether the unity-of-interest-and-ownership prong is satisfied, but it is not a
dispositive factor." R. p. 167 L. 2-4 (emphasis in original). Appellants have not presented any
binding Idaho case law demonstrating that the District Court's analysis was incorrect.
Because the District Court concluded that Carrie Edwards' lack of status as a
shareholder did not automatically preclude her personal liability, the District Court focused
instead on whether Carrie Edwards' own degree of involvement and control in MFL was so
great so as to make her personally liable. The District Court found the answer was yes.
According to the evidence presented, including Carrie Edwards's testimony, Ms. Edwards was
"directly involved in the day-to-day management of MFL." R. Aug. p. 44,

1 9.

Indeed, Carrie

Edwards was extensively involved in all of the Edwards' corporations, including MFL. Carrie
Edwards participated in the negotiations and hiring of Mr. Lunneborg2, she was involved in the

For example, "Dan and Carrie Edwards, Lunneborg and Schlapfer met at the Coeur d'Alene Resort Golf Course
cafo. That led to a dinner two days later with Dan and Carrie Edwards ... Two days after that dinner Lunneborg
2

Respondent's Brief - 34
{Sl640955; l)

ongoing communications and discussions 3, and most importantly she was responsible for the
almost constant commingling and transferring of funds between corporate and personal
accounts, all without executing any promissory notes or any other indicia of debt. R. Aug. 3236. Rather than finding Carrie Edwards an innocent bystander, the District Court found that
Carrie Edwards ''directly benefited from using the corporate assets," (R. Aug. p. 45,

~

18) and it

was Carrie Edwards who "primarily, if not exclusively, moved the money around ... [siphoned
off the assets of MFL] and made MFL prematurely judgment proof." R. p. 170 L. 3-7 (emphasis
added). Given Carrie Edwards complete disregard for the corporate form and her culpability in
depleting MFL's assets, it was proper for the District Court to find her jointly and severally
liable. A thorough review of the record demonstrates that the District Court's decision was
supported by substantial and competent evidence and should be affirmed.

E.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding Lunneborg
Attorney's Fees and Costs.

"An award of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and
subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review." Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 901, 104
P.3d 367, 375 (2004). "In reviewing an exercise of discretion, this Court must consider '(1)
whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial
court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court

reviewed several ofMFL's financial reports provided by Carrie Edwards." R. Aug. p. 6, L. 20-24. See, e.g., R. Aug.
pp. 12-13.
3 See, e.g., R. Aug. pp. 12-13.
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reached its decision by an exercise of reason."' Id. at 902, 104 P.3d at 376 (quoting Sun Valley

Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)).
Appellants argue that the attorney's fees and costs awarded to Lunneborg was an abuse
of discretion, (Appellants' Br. p. 43, L. 3-4) and that the District Court "fail[ed] to conduct a
proper analysis." Appellants' Br. p. 44 L. 5-6. Appellants do not provide any case law or
statutory authority to support their argument, nor do the appellants offer any evidentiary
support. Certainly, Appellants fail to cite anything that would allow a reviewing court to reverse
or remand. Indeed, Appellants' argument is easily rejected by a review of the District Court's
13-plus page, very thorough and very complete analysis in suppo11 of its award of attorney's
fees. Because the District Court's award of attorney's fees was not an abuse of discretion, it
should be affirmed.
In this case, although the District Court was not required to make specific findings as to
I.C. § 54(e)(3), nor was it required to demonstrate how it employed the factors in determining
an award amount (Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. North Pacific Ins. Co., 127 Idaho 716,
720, 905 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1995)), the District Court thoroughly, completely, and reasonably
analyzed and discussed each of the I.C. § 54(e)(3) factors. R. pp. 173-187.
Although Appellants allege that the District Court awarded attorney's fees to punish the
them, this is not supported by the record. Appellants' Br. p. 44, L. 2-13. Rather, the attorney's
fees were awarded because Lunneborg was statutorily entitled to the fees. The amount of the
fees awarded was based on a reasonable number of hours worked at a reasonable hourly rate.
The supporting evidence was thoroughly examined by the District Court. R. pp. 172-186.
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Indeed, after thoroughly reviewing the amount requested and the supporting documents,
the District Court reduced the amount of attorney's fees requested by Lunneborg. In reducing
the number of attorney hours, the District Court noted the deduction was not because "the hours
were not spent on the case" and contrary to appellants' allegations, it was not because "any of
the work was duplicative" or unnecessary. R. p. 179, L. 5-13. Rather, it determined that a 10%
reduction was appropriate, thus reducing the amount of the attorney's fees requested by
$21,766.50. R. p. 180, L. 5-6. The Trial court reduced the fees by an additional $16,588.00
when it also reduced the hourly rate allowed for one of Plaintiffs attorneys despite the
attorney's extensive experience and skills. R. p. 180, L. 16-25.
Importantly, Appellants fail to address the real reason the attorney's fees might be
higher than other cases involving three-day trial - the bad conduct of the Appellants. Indeed,
the Trial court emphasized several times that it was Defendants "bad conduct [that] cause more
hours to be spent by Lunneborg's attorneys ... [because] Lunneborg's attorneys had to work
harder and expend more hours dealing with discovery abuses perpetuated by defendants,
dealing with defendant MFL's bankruptcy" and because "there were volumes of defendants
financial records that had to be poured over." R. p. 184, L. 1-4; p. 185. L. 7. The Trial court
explained that the reason "the case did not resolve quickly was due to the Defendant actions
throughout the litigation, first, with failing to comply with discovery rules, and second, with
filing bankruptcy. There is a difference between recalcitrance (almost all adverse parties are
recalcitrant) and actively obstructing your opponent and doing so by violating discovery rules
and the rules under which you operate a corporation." R. p. 183, L. 13-18.
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From a thorough review of the record, the award of attorney's fees should be affirmed
because the Trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, it acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion, and it reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Therefore, the Trial court's award of attorney's fees was not an abuse of its discretion.

V.

CONCLUSION
The appellants have failed to carry their burden on appeal. Indeed, Appellants' brief is

devoid of any credible argument that the Trial court applied incorrect law. Additionally,
appellants fail to provide this Court with any credible evidentiary grounds for reversing the
Trial comt. The Trial court painstakingly provided fact after credible fact in support of its
decisions. Regardless of whether this Court may have weighed the evidence differently, "the
findings made by the trial judge [may] not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Sun Valley

Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391
(1990). Thus, to succeed on appeal, appellants had to present evidence sufficient to establish
that the trial court's finding were unreasonable. Appellants did not provide any credible
argument or facts sufficient to support such a finding. Based on the foregoing the decisions of
the trial court should be upheld in their entirety.
DATED this 26 th day of December, 2017.

opher G. Varallo, ISB #6135
Daniel J. Gibbons, ISB #6202
Michael F. Nienstedt, ISB #3770
Counsel for the Respondent
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Michael Hague
Hague Law Offices, PLLC
401 Front Ave., Ste. 212
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
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